Mallory’s work explores the politics of public policy in the United States. She examines both the political development and political consequences of policies enacted to regulate the economic, social, and political behavior of American citizens and firms.
Her research bridges institutional and behavioral approaches to ask two related questions: Why and how are certain policy design, implementation, and administrative strategies adopted? Once adopted, how do those policy features subsequently reshape the political preferences and behaviors of policymakers, organized interests, and ordinary Americans?
Mallory's scholarship is motivated primarily by an interest in better understanding how policymaking creates, reproduces, expands, or mitigates intersectional inequality in the United States.
Her research bridges institutional and behavioral approaches to ask two related questions: Why and how are certain policy design, implementation, and administrative strategies adopted? Once adopted, how do those policy features subsequently reshape the political preferences and behaviors of policymakers, organized interests, and ordinary Americans?
Mallory's scholarship is motivated primarily by an interest in better understanding how policymaking creates, reproduces, expands, or mitigates intersectional inequality in the United States.
Publications
7 (Mallory E. SoRelle. FC. "Social Welfare Policy." In Ed. Nancy Burns, Oxford Handbook of the New Deal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mallory E. SoRelle and Alexis N. Walker. 2016. "Partisan Preemption: the Strategic Use of Federal Preemption Legislation." Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 46(4): 486-509.
Mallory E. SoRelle. 2016. "Politics of the Policyscape." In Ed. Ali Farazmand, Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer International.
Suzanne Mettler and Mallory SoRelle. 2017 [2014]. "Policy Feedback." In Eds. Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Weible. Theories of the Policy Process. Fourth edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Mallory E. SoRelle and Alexis N. Walker. 2016. "Partisan Preemption: the Strategic Use of Federal Preemption Legislation." Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 46(4): 486-509.
- Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
- Scholars Strategy Network Key Findings Brief
Mallory E. SoRelle. 2016. "Politics of the Policyscape." In Ed. Ali Farazmand, Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer International.
Suzanne Mettler and Mallory SoRelle. 2017 [2014]. "Policy Feedback." In Eds. Sabatier, Paul A., and Christopher M. Weible. Theories of the Policy Process. Fourth edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Book Manuscript
Democracy Declined: The Failed Politics of Consumer Credit
Winner of the 2017 E.E. Schattschneider award for best dissertation in American government, APSA
Winner of the 2017 Janice N. & Milton J. Esman Prize for outstanding dissertation, Department of Government, Cornell University
Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
Consumer credit is central to the U.S. economy as both a driver of mass consumption and a key source of financial support for the average American. As consumer borrowing has proliferated in recent decades, so too has the prevalence of predatory lending. The growth of consumer borrowing under increasingly unsustainable conditions poses serious risks to the financial security of individuals and the American economy. Yet, policymakers have failed to enact effective consumer financial protections, and consumers have not engaged in political action to address complaints with credit. Advocacy groups have also been stymied in their efforts to mobilize consumers and to lobby regulators in support of stronger consumer financial protections. Why have these actors all struggled to address problems with such an important part of the U.S. economy through political action?
I propose a policy-centered answer. I argue that the U.S. has a political economy of credit in which New Deal policymakers deliberately embraced credit to fuel a consumption economy, consequently prioritizing the performance of the national economy over the protection of individual borrowers. Constrained by a scheme of their own invention, I contend that legislators are forced to prioritize widespread credit access over meaningful consumer protection, leading to the adoption of information disclosures as the primary form of credit regulation. Once enacted, the design, implementation, and administration of these policies produce regulatory feedback effects that reshape the political behavior of bureaucrats, consumer advocates, and ordinary Americans. First, credit policies privatize and personalize the use of consumer credit, diminishing citizen political engagement and complicating advocacy mobilization efforts. Second, administrative authority for credit policy is fragmented across agencies designed to promote the financial security of banks over that of individuals, leading to regulatory arbitrage that obstructs bureaucratic policymaking, public interest lobbying, and consumer participation in the regulatory arena. I employ multiple methods, leveraging archival research, legislative analyses, public opinion and complaint data, survey experiments, and elite interviews to explore these dynamics. I conclude that these feedback effects contribute to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, ultimately threatening the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole.
Winner of the 2017 E.E. Schattschneider award for best dissertation in American government, APSA
Winner of the 2017 Janice N. & Milton J. Esman Prize for outstanding dissertation, Department of Government, Cornell University
Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
Consumer credit is central to the U.S. economy as both a driver of mass consumption and a key source of financial support for the average American. As consumer borrowing has proliferated in recent decades, so too has the prevalence of predatory lending. The growth of consumer borrowing under increasingly unsustainable conditions poses serious risks to the financial security of individuals and the American economy. Yet, policymakers have failed to enact effective consumer financial protections, and consumers have not engaged in political action to address complaints with credit. Advocacy groups have also been stymied in their efforts to mobilize consumers and to lobby regulators in support of stronger consumer financial protections. Why have these actors all struggled to address problems with such an important part of the U.S. economy through political action?
I propose a policy-centered answer. I argue that the U.S. has a political economy of credit in which New Deal policymakers deliberately embraced credit to fuel a consumption economy, consequently prioritizing the performance of the national economy over the protection of individual borrowers. Constrained by a scheme of their own invention, I contend that legislators are forced to prioritize widespread credit access over meaningful consumer protection, leading to the adoption of information disclosures as the primary form of credit regulation. Once enacted, the design, implementation, and administration of these policies produce regulatory feedback effects that reshape the political behavior of bureaucrats, consumer advocates, and ordinary Americans. First, credit policies privatize and personalize the use of consumer credit, diminishing citizen political engagement and complicating advocacy mobilization efforts. Second, administrative authority for credit policy is fragmented across agencies designed to promote the financial security of banks over that of individuals, leading to regulatory arbitrage that obstructs bureaucratic policymaking, public interest lobbying, and consumer participation in the regulatory arena. I employ multiple methods, leveraging archival research, legislative analyses, public opinion and complaint data, survey experiments, and elite interviews to explore these dynamics. I conclude that these feedback effects contribute to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, ultimately threatening the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole.
Under Review
"Full Disclosure: The Development and Policy Constraints of the U.S. Political Economy of Credit"
As consumer borrowing proliferated under increasingly risky lending terms policymakers failed to enact effective consumer financial protections. Why? I argue that the U.S. has a political economy of credit in which New Deal policymakers deliberately embraced credit to help fuel a consumption economy, consequently prioritizing the performance of the national economy over the protection of individual borrowers. Constrained by a scheme of their own invention, I contend that legislators were subsequently bound by a path dependent process whereby they had to prioritize widespread credit access over meaningful consumer protection, leading to the adoption of information disclosure as the primary form of credit regulation. I leverage archival research, legislative analyses, and public opinion data to explore these dynamics. I conclude that the creation of a political economy of credit contributes to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, with consequences for the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole. This article also contributes to our understanding of the effect of New Deal policymaking on the development of both the U.S. political economy and welfare state.
“Where the Poor Vote More: Relative Income and Political Participation”
The common narrative of political participation in the U.S. holds that people with more material resources are likely to be more politically engaged. But some lower-income Americans participate in politics a great deal more than others, even when accounting for other important characteristics like age and education. What explains this variation? I argue that the effect of an individual’s material resources on his or her political engagement is geographically contingent. Specifically, I contend that an individual's income, relative to the members of his or her community, positively correlates with political mobilization and subsequent political activity. The study employs statistical analysis of census tract level data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey to test its hypotheses. The implications of these results are particularly important for how scholars and practitioners treat the prospects for participation by low-income Americans in an increasingly income-segregated world.
"Facilitating Trust and Engagement to Foster a Culture of Health" with Michael Jones-Correa
This article has two goals: It proposes shifting the discussion away from focusing on engagement in health as an outcome in itself, and rather to move toward thinking about engagement in health, politics, and policy as part of single feedback loop. In this policy feedback loop, individuals' health shapes their engagement in politics, which shapes their views of health policy and health policy outcomes, which in turn shapes their health. Second, this article addresses the problem of those who fall outside of this policy feedback loop, the disengagement of marginalized individuals. These individuals' health is shaped by policy, but they often have little say in the shaping of policy themselves. Low-income, undocumented immigrants, in particular, many of them Latinos, have low levels of both trust and civic engagement. Trust and engagement can be encouraged, however, by contact with others in social arenas like neighborhoods, work and public spaces. A culture of health, we argue, requires attention to the feedback loop of health, engagement and public policy, and to ensuring that even those on the margins of society have the opportunity to participate.
Working Papers
"Partisanship and the Submerged State: Experiments in Social Policy Recognition" with Delphia Shanks-Booth
Winner of the 2016 APSA Best Poster in Public Policy Award
"An Institutional Theory of Public Interest Participation in Rulemaking"
“Health as a Political Resource” with Michael Jones-Correa
"New Voters, New Parties: When Does Enfranchisement Lead to Party System Change?" with Steffen Blings
Winner of the 2016 APSA Best Poster in Public Policy Award
"An Institutional Theory of Public Interest Participation in Rulemaking"
“Health as a Political Resource” with Michael Jones-Correa
"New Voters, New Parties: When Does Enfranchisement Lead to Party System Change?" with Steffen Blings
