Mallory’s work explores the political development and political consequences of public policies in the United States. She is particularly interested in policies that provide necessary, but non-traditional, resources - like access to consumer credit - that Americans have come to rely on instead of more "traditional" welfare programs. Her scholarship is motivated primarily by an interest in better understanding how policymaking creates, reproduces, expands, or mitigates intersecting forms of inequality in the United States.
"Partisan Preemption: the Strategic Use of Federal Preemption Legislation"
(w/Alexis Walker), 2016, Publius: the Journal of Federalism, 46(4)
Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
Scholars Strategy Network Key Findings Brief
"Social Welfare Policy"
Forthcoming, in Ed. Nancy Burns, Oxford Handbook of the New Deal
"Policy Feedback"
(w/Suzanne Mettler), 2017, in Eds. Paul A. Sabatier, and Christopher M. Weible, Theories of the Policy Process, Fourth edition (3rd Edition published in 2014)
"Politics of the Policyscape"
2016, in Ed. Ali Farazmand, Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance
Democracy Declined: The Failed Politics of Consumer Financial Protection
Winner of the 2017 E.E. Schattschneider award for best dissertation in American government, APSA
Winner of the 2017 Janice N. & Milton J. Esman Prize for outstanding dissertation, Department of Government, Cornell University
Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
Borrowing has become the American way of life. From credit and debit cards to bank accounts and loans, most of us rely on financing to pay for everything from a cup of coffee to a college education. For many, borrowing is the only way to afford daily necessities in the absence of better wages or more robust welfare benefits. But borrowing to live is a double-edged sword. For every person who survives, or even thrives, with the aid of consumer credit, the danger of financial ruin from high interest rates, fees, and mounting debt lurks close behind. One need only recall the 2008 financial crisis to see how the boom in consumer borrowing under increasingly costly, some say predatory, lending terms threatens the financial security of American families and the national economy. Despite this threat, federal policymakers—in Congress and regulatory agencies—have largely failed to curb risky lending practices. Angry borrowers have focused their energy and action primarily on banks, lenders, and even trade associations, instead of demanding that lawmakers address predatory behavior. Advocacy groups have also been stymied in their efforts to mobilize borrowers politically and to lobby regulators in support of stronger consumer financial protections. Why have these groups all struggled to find political strategies to shore up such a fundamental cog in the U.S. economy?
In Democracy Declined, I propose a policy-centered answer: the politics of U.S. consumer financial protection, from mass political behavior to bureaucratic decision making, can be explained by the historical evolution of consumer finance policies and the consequences, or feedback effects, they produce. I show how New Deal policymakers developed what I call a political economy of credit, embracing credit to fuel a consumption economy. Constrained by a scheme of their predecessors’ invention, lawmakers today must cultivate broad credit access to maintain the political economy of credit, even when it means adopting weak consumer financial protections, primarily in the form of information disclosures. I then demonstrate how the design, implementation, and administration of these disclosures produce what I call regulatory feedback effects that shape the politics of bureaucrats, consumer advocates, and ordinary Americans. First, credit regulations privatize and personalize the use of consumer finance, encouraging people to address their problems with financial not political institutions. This limits advocates’ attempts at political mobilization. Second, the ability to enforce credit policy is fragmented across multiple federal agencies, each designed to promote the financial security of banks over individuals. This creates a regulatory race to the bottom that weakens bureaucratic rulemaking, public interest lobbying, and consumer participation in the regulatory arena. I conclude that these feedback effects contribute to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, ultimately threatening the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole.
Winner of the 2017 E.E. Schattschneider award for best dissertation in American government, APSA
Winner of the 2017 Janice N. & Milton J. Esman Prize for outstanding dissertation, Department of Government, Cornell University
Featured in the Washington Post's Monkey Cage Blog
Borrowing has become the American way of life. From credit and debit cards to bank accounts and loans, most of us rely on financing to pay for everything from a cup of coffee to a college education. For many, borrowing is the only way to afford daily necessities in the absence of better wages or more robust welfare benefits. But borrowing to live is a double-edged sword. For every person who survives, or even thrives, with the aid of consumer credit, the danger of financial ruin from high interest rates, fees, and mounting debt lurks close behind. One need only recall the 2008 financial crisis to see how the boom in consumer borrowing under increasingly costly, some say predatory, lending terms threatens the financial security of American families and the national economy. Despite this threat, federal policymakers—in Congress and regulatory agencies—have largely failed to curb risky lending practices. Angry borrowers have focused their energy and action primarily on banks, lenders, and even trade associations, instead of demanding that lawmakers address predatory behavior. Advocacy groups have also been stymied in their efforts to mobilize borrowers politically and to lobby regulators in support of stronger consumer financial protections. Why have these groups all struggled to find political strategies to shore up such a fundamental cog in the U.S. economy?
In Democracy Declined, I propose a policy-centered answer: the politics of U.S. consumer financial protection, from mass political behavior to bureaucratic decision making, can be explained by the historical evolution of consumer finance policies and the consequences, or feedback effects, they produce. I show how New Deal policymakers developed what I call a political economy of credit, embracing credit to fuel a consumption economy. Constrained by a scheme of their predecessors’ invention, lawmakers today must cultivate broad credit access to maintain the political economy of credit, even when it means adopting weak consumer financial protections, primarily in the form of information disclosures. I then demonstrate how the design, implementation, and administration of these disclosures produce what I call regulatory feedback effects that shape the politics of bureaucrats, consumer advocates, and ordinary Americans. First, credit regulations privatize and personalize the use of consumer finance, encouraging people to address their problems with financial not political institutions. This limits advocates’ attempts at political mobilization. Second, the ability to enforce credit policy is fragmented across multiple federal agencies, each designed to promote the financial security of banks over individuals. This creates a regulatory race to the bottom that weakens bureaucratic rulemaking, public interest lobbying, and consumer participation in the regulatory arena. I conclude that these feedback effects contribute to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, ultimately threatening the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole.
"Full Disclosure: The Development and Policy Constraints of the U.S. Political Economy of Credit"
(revise and resubmit)
As consumer borrowing proliferated under increasingly risky lending terms policymakers failed to enact effective consumer financial protections. Why? I argue that the U.S. has a political economy of credit in which New Deal policymakers deliberately embraced credit to help fuel a consumption economy, consequently prioritizing the performance of the national economy over the protection of individual borrowers. Constrained by a scheme of their own invention, I contend that legislators were subsequently bound by a path dependent process wherein they had to prioritize widespread credit access over meaningful consumer protection, leading to the adoption of information disclosure as the primary form of credit regulation. I leverage archival research, legislative analyses, and public opinion data to explore these dynamics. I conclude that the creation of a political economy of credit contributes to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, with consequences for the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole. This article also contributes to our understanding of the effect of New Deal policymaking on the development of both the U.S. political economy and welfare state.
(revise and resubmit)
As consumer borrowing proliferated under increasingly risky lending terms policymakers failed to enact effective consumer financial protections. Why? I argue that the U.S. has a political economy of credit in which New Deal policymakers deliberately embraced credit to help fuel a consumption economy, consequently prioritizing the performance of the national economy over the protection of individual borrowers. Constrained by a scheme of their own invention, I contend that legislators were subsequently bound by a path dependent process wherein they had to prioritize widespread credit access over meaningful consumer protection, leading to the adoption of information disclosure as the primary form of credit regulation. I leverage archival research, legislative analyses, and public opinion data to explore these dynamics. I conclude that the creation of a political economy of credit contributes to the ongoing failure to enact meaningful consumer credit protections, with consequences for the financial security of borrowers and the nation as a whole. This article also contributes to our understanding of the effect of New Deal policymaking on the development of both the U.S. political economy and welfare state.
"From Personal Responsibility to Political Mobilization: Framing Collective Action"
One of the most significant and expansive neoliberal policy regimes to affect the economic security of American families today is consumer financial regulation. Despite its importance in the lives of most Americans, however, public interest groups have experienced great difficulty mobilizing people to take political action in support of better consumer financial regulations. Instead, consumers are more likely to act within the market itself in response to financial grievances, potentially foreclosing an entire realm of policy remedies that might bolster their economic security. How can people with financial grievances be mobilized politically to support stronger regulatory policy? More generally, can the demobilizing effect of social and economic policies that emphasize personal responsibility and rational market action be overcome? This paper proposes that emphasizing government’s role in and responsibility for economic regulation may help increase the likelihood that individuals will engage politically in support of a regulatory policy remedy, but only if the message resonates with an individual’s preexisting considerations about government intervention. The paper tests this hypothesis with three distinct competitive framing survey experiments.
One of the most significant and expansive neoliberal policy regimes to affect the economic security of American families today is consumer financial regulation. Despite its importance in the lives of most Americans, however, public interest groups have experienced great difficulty mobilizing people to take political action in support of better consumer financial regulations. Instead, consumers are more likely to act within the market itself in response to financial grievances, potentially foreclosing an entire realm of policy remedies that might bolster their economic security. How can people with financial grievances be mobilized politically to support stronger regulatory policy? More generally, can the demobilizing effect of social and economic policies that emphasize personal responsibility and rational market action be overcome? This paper proposes that emphasizing government’s role in and responsibility for economic regulation may help increase the likelihood that individuals will engage politically in support of a regulatory policy remedy, but only if the message resonates with an individual’s preexisting considerations about government intervention. The paper tests this hypothesis with three distinct competitive framing survey experiments.
"The Acknowledgement Gap: Partisanship, Policy Feedback, and Social Programs"
(w/Delphia Shanks-Booth)
Winner of the 2016 APSA Best Poster in Public Policy Award
Nearly all Americans have received government social benefits, yet many don’t acknowledge “using government social programs.” This discrepancy is particularly striking for Republicans. Why? Recent work on the so-called submerged state proposes that people who receive social assistance through market mechanisms don’t realize that the benefits they get are the result of government policy, and, therefore, they do not acknowledge receiving government assistance. Motivated reasoning and social desirability bias might also explain the gap between acknowledging and using social programs, particularly for Republicans and those who hold negative opinions of welfare. We classify the existing literature into three potential explanations—delivery, definition, and social desirability—and argue that, while information seems to help address acknowledgement discrepancies, partisanship imposes limits on the usefulness of neutral data. We test this intuition with a survey experiment. The results of this study provide support for multiple mechanisms at work, but they confirm that a partisan acknowledgement gap exists when it comes to how people think about their own experiences with government, and it persists despite treatments designed to minimize that gap. The study has significant implications for the conditions under which partisanship and policy usage coalesce to undermine support for government policymaking.
(w/Delphia Shanks-Booth)
Winner of the 2016 APSA Best Poster in Public Policy Award
Nearly all Americans have received government social benefits, yet many don’t acknowledge “using government social programs.” This discrepancy is particularly striking for Republicans. Why? Recent work on the so-called submerged state proposes that people who receive social assistance through market mechanisms don’t realize that the benefits they get are the result of government policy, and, therefore, they do not acknowledge receiving government assistance. Motivated reasoning and social desirability bias might also explain the gap between acknowledging and using social programs, particularly for Republicans and those who hold negative opinions of welfare. We classify the existing literature into three potential explanations—delivery, definition, and social desirability—and argue that, while information seems to help address acknowledgement discrepancies, partisanship imposes limits on the usefulness of neutral data. We test this intuition with a survey experiment. The results of this study provide support for multiple mechanisms at work, but they confirm that a partisan acknowledgement gap exists when it comes to how people think about their own experiences with government, and it persists despite treatments designed to minimize that gap. The study has significant implications for the conditions under which partisanship and policy usage coalesce to undermine support for government policymaking.
"Philanthropy, Public Interest Groups, and Second-order Feedback Effects"
(w/Delphia Shanks-Booth)
under review
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced formal legal barriers designed to limit the political activities of foundations. How do these constraints affect the funding decisions of foundations and the capacity of public interest advocacy organizations that rely on philanthropic support for their work? We argue that the policy regime governing private foundations’ work has produced two layers of feedback effects that not only shape philanthropic behavior, but also create real obstacles for grantee organizations and their political advocacy efforts. We contend that, particularly for recipient organizations who 1) have a primary mission of political advocacy and mobilization and 2) rely heavily on philanthropic support, the policies governing foundation behavior can create incompatible goals between grantors and grantees pursuing political advocacy and policy change. Drawing on records of grant activity, archival work, and elite interviews we explore this argument using a salient case study: anti-predatory lending reform.
(w/Delphia Shanks-Booth)
under review
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 introduced formal legal barriers designed to limit the political activities of foundations. How do these constraints affect the funding decisions of foundations and the capacity of public interest advocacy organizations that rely on philanthropic support for their work? We argue that the policy regime governing private foundations’ work has produced two layers of feedback effects that not only shape philanthropic behavior, but also create real obstacles for grantee organizations and their political advocacy efforts. We contend that, particularly for recipient organizations who 1) have a primary mission of political advocacy and mobilization and 2) rely heavily on philanthropic support, the policies governing foundation behavior can create incompatible goals between grantors and grantees pursuing political advocacy and policy change. Drawing on records of grant activity, archival work, and elite interviews we explore this argument using a salient case study: anti-predatory lending reform.
"Regulatory Feedback Effects and Public Interest Participation in Protective Regulation"
What drives public interest participation in the rulemaking process? By some estimates, bureaucratic rulemaking now produces 90% of all federal laws enacted each year, including an increasing volume of protective regulation. Yet, public interest groups and citizens participate in regulatory politics at far lower rates than their industry counterparts. Current scholarship on regulatory engagement, which focuses primarily on policy and participant attributes, falls short in its ability to explain patterns of public interest participation. In this paper, I develop an institutional theory of regulatory politics. I contend that the administrative arrangement of rulemaking and enforcement authority for an issue produces feedback effects that shape the political behavior of bureaucrats, interest groups, and citizens during the rulemaking process. Specifically, I argue that the distribution of regulatory authority—either centralized in a single agency or fragmented across multiple agencies—interacts with the mission of the agencies to which authority is assigned to produce different modes of regulatory politics: capture, arbitrage, and public interest rulemaking. I provide an initial test of this theory using the case of consumer financial protection, which offers the ability to explore regulatory politics for a single issue under two (possibly all three) distinctive institutional arrangements. Employing historical legislative analyses, elite interviews, and public comment data, I demonstrate how changing the administrative arrangement for a particular issue reshapes the political efficacy of public interest groups and citizens, with potentially significant consequences.
What drives public interest participation in the rulemaking process? By some estimates, bureaucratic rulemaking now produces 90% of all federal laws enacted each year, including an increasing volume of protective regulation. Yet, public interest groups and citizens participate in regulatory politics at far lower rates than their industry counterparts. Current scholarship on regulatory engagement, which focuses primarily on policy and participant attributes, falls short in its ability to explain patterns of public interest participation. In this paper, I develop an institutional theory of regulatory politics. I contend that the administrative arrangement of rulemaking and enforcement authority for an issue produces feedback effects that shape the political behavior of bureaucrats, interest groups, and citizens during the rulemaking process. Specifically, I argue that the distribution of regulatory authority—either centralized in a single agency or fragmented across multiple agencies—interacts with the mission of the agencies to which authority is assigned to produce different modes of regulatory politics: capture, arbitrage, and public interest rulemaking. I provide an initial test of this theory using the case of consumer financial protection, which offers the ability to explore regulatory politics for a single issue under two (possibly all three) distinctive institutional arrangements. Employing historical legislative analyses, elite interviews, and public comment data, I demonstrate how changing the administrative arrangement for a particular issue reshapes the political efficacy of public interest groups and citizens, with potentially significant consequences.
"The Politics of the Justice Gap"
(w/Jamila Michener)
The “justice gap”—the difference between the level of legal assistance necessary to meet the needs of low-income Americans and the level of legal assistance actually available to them—is striking. Between 50 to 80% of people living in poverty in the U.S. have difficulty obtaining civil legal representation (CLR), leaving them without the means to protect their rights in situations ranging from eviction to predatory lending to domestic violence. These rights are especially critical to folks who are struggling to keep themselves and their families healthy, safe, and financially afloat, so the inability of many low-income people, and particularly women of color, to access civil legal representation threatens that well-being. Despite the significance of the justice gap to the lives of marginalized communities across the United States, political scientists know little about this issue. This project offers the first systematic examination of the role that American political institutions and dynamics play in shaping the development—including both expansion and retrenchment—of the justice gap.
We aim to answer three core questions in this project: 1) Historically, how have political institutions (like federalism, executive power, and political parties) shaped the state and national policies that determine access to civil legal representation? 2) How does access (or lack thereof) to civil legal assistance affect the political attitudes and actions of low-income Americans? 3) How does civil legal representation affect American politics more broadly?
(w/Jamila Michener)
The “justice gap”—the difference between the level of legal assistance necessary to meet the needs of low-income Americans and the level of legal assistance actually available to them—is striking. Between 50 to 80% of people living in poverty in the U.S. have difficulty obtaining civil legal representation (CLR), leaving them without the means to protect their rights in situations ranging from eviction to predatory lending to domestic violence. These rights are especially critical to folks who are struggling to keep themselves and their families healthy, safe, and financially afloat, so the inability of many low-income people, and particularly women of color, to access civil legal representation threatens that well-being. Despite the significance of the justice gap to the lives of marginalized communities across the United States, political scientists know little about this issue. This project offers the first systematic examination of the role that American political institutions and dynamics play in shaping the development—including both expansion and retrenchment—of the justice gap.
We aim to answer three core questions in this project: 1) Historically, how have political institutions (like federalism, executive power, and political parties) shaped the state and national policies that determine access to civil legal representation? 2) How does access (or lack thereof) to civil legal assistance affect the political attitudes and actions of low-income Americans? 3) How does civil legal representation affect American politics more broadly?